Synergy: Integer Overflow, Key Reuse, IV Reuse

Synergy is a software that lets you share your mouse and keyboard between multiple computers. Until recently, it didn't have any support for encryption, which left users' keystrokes and mouse movements vulnerable to sniffing on the local network. Users worked around this limitation by tunneling Synergy's communications through a VPN or SSH. Lots of users complained, and the Synergy team decided to encrypt the connections. Instead of using a well-known protocol like TLS, they invented their own.

The most obvious problem is that they are re-using the same key and IV for encrypted communications in both directions. This is absolutely fatal for modes like CTR, OFB, GCM, and probably CFB, which are the ones Synergy supports.

Second, they derive the IV from the password, and because of an integer overflow bug, when the length of the password is congruent to its double mod 256, the key and the IV are the same. If the IV were the same size as the output of the hash function they're using (SHA256), you'd be able to recover the key for all passwords longer than 128 characters.

Synergy: Integer Overflow, Key Reuse, IV Reuse | Cryptofails

HP D2D/StoreOnce Storage unit backdoors

HP D2D Storage unit

HP was exposed back in 2010 with a horrendously embarassing backdoor in their SAN technologies. I'm not sure where someone in management had that "oh shit" moment, but the seem to have forgotten it quickly by implementing the same exact problem in their D2D hardware.
In this case, we're pretty much talking about history repeating, with noone at HP being any the wiser. The difference is, this time, nothing is public (yet), so HP are working on their "close your eyes and it might go away" approach.

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